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Far	right	politics	in	Germany:	From	fascism	to
populism?
The	rise	of	the	Alternative	for	Germany	(AfD)	was	one	of	the	major	stories	of	the	2017
German	elections.	As	Tomáš	Nociar	and	Jan	Philipp	Thomeczek	write,	there	has	been	a
tendency	among	some	commentators	to	draw	parallels	between	the	AfD	and	extremist	or
fascist	parties	from	Germany’s	past.	They	argue	that	this	is	both	unhelpful	and	inaccurate,
and	that	the	AfD	has	far	more	in	common	with	other	‘populist’	parties	who	have	had
success	in	recent	European	elections.
There	is	a	current,	often	criticised	trend	to	use	the	term	populism	to	describe	contemporary	far	right	politics.	One	of
the	frequent	objections	usually	coming	from	the	political	left	is	that	the	concept	is	not	negative	enough	to	capture	all
the	malicious	aspects	of	the	far	right	and	therefore	helps	to	legitimise	it.	However,	the	often-proposed	solution,	to	use
the	word	‘fascism’	instead,	may	be	even	more	problematic.
Populism	as	a	phenomenon	is	a	relatively	new	trait	within	far	right	traditionally	elitist	ideological	circles.	Several
authors	point	out	that	it	is	precisely	populism	that	distinguishes	the	traditional	post-war	antidemocratic	extreme	right,
which	was	inspired	by	interwar	fascist	movements,	from	the	modern	populist	far	right	parties.	According	to	Piero
Ignazi,	the	main	difference	between	the	new	forms	of	far	right	and	the	traditional	extreme	right	is	that	the	latter	is,
among	others,	also	characterised	by	antidemocratic	nostalgia	for	interwar	fascism	expressed	in	references	to	its
myths,	symbols,	slogans	or	the	ideology	of	fascism.	Does	that	mean	that	populism	and	fascism	are	mutually
exclusive?	The	situation	is	not	that	straightforward,	and	the	relationship	between	populism	and	fascism	is	more
nuanced.
One	of	the	most	widespread	definitions	of	populism	today	is	by	Cas	Mudde	who	sees	it	as	a	“thin	ideology	that
considers	society	to	be	essentially	divided	between	two	antagonistic	and	homogeneous	groups,	the	pure	people	and
the	corrupt	elite,	and	wants	politics	to	reflect	the	general	will	of	the	people”.	Only	if	these	three	necessary	elements
(anti-elitism,	people	centrism	and	the	emphasis	on	the	‘general	will’)	are	present	can	we	actually	speak	of	populism.
Even	though	interwar	fascist	movements	were	strongly	criticising	the	“established	elite”	as	well	as	frequently	referring
to	the	people,	they	were	never	in	favour	of	the	idea	of	the	people	as	sovereign	and	the	general	will.	In	fact,	because
of	their	elitist	and	autocratic	legacy	embodied	in	the	‘Führer	Principle’,	fascist	movements	always	despised	the	idea
of	popular	sovereignty.	In	contrast,	populists	support	democracy	but	pursue,	according	to	Takis	Pappas,	“democratic
illiberalism”:	a	majoritarian	form	of	democracy	that	rejects	liberal	elements	such	as	checks	and	balances	and	minority
rights.	Therefore,	we	can	conclude	that,	while	the	classical	fascist	movements	show	conceptual	overlap	with
populism,	they	neither	were	nor	are	populists	as	such.
The	situation	is	slightly	different	with	the	contemporary	post-war	far	right.	Those	parties	are	aware	of	the
ineffectiveness	of	the	extreme	right´s	old	ideological	framework	consisting	of	biological	racism,	anti-Semitism,	and
anti-democracy,	as	Jens	Rydgren	argues.	It	is	the	result	of	the	delegitimisation,	stigmatisation	and	consequent
marginalisation	of	anything	that	has	been	associated	with	Nazism	or	fascism	after	WWII.	This	new	type	of	populist
radical	right	party	either	never	developed	or	dropped	the	antidemocratic	sentiment	in	favour	of	a	populist	critique	of
the	establishment.
Instead	of	biological	racism,	they	now	articulate	ethnonationalist	xenophobia	and	cultural	racism	based	on	the
concept	of	ethnopluralism.	Here,	the	emphasis	is	put	on	the	supposed	“incompatibility”	of	different	cultures	instead	of
a	hierarchical	relationship	of	“races”.	These,	on	first	sight	insignificant	ideological	differences,	played	an	important
role	in	legitimising	the	originally	discredited	far	right	ideology.	As	a	result,	the	new	far	right	managed	to	mobilise
xenophobic	public	opinion	without	being	stigmatised	as	racists.	At	the	same	time,	through	a	populist	critique	of	the
establishment,	they	managed	to	present	their	criticism	of	the	current	liberal	democratic	system	without	being
marginalised	or	banned	for	being	extremists.
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Perhaps	there	is	no	better	illustration	of	this	argument	than	the	recent	electoral	success	of	the	Alternative	for
Germany	(AfD).	The	fact	that	they	entered	the	newly	elected	German	Bundestag	immediately	triggered	several
headlines	comparing	today’s	situation	to	the	rise	of	Nazi	fascism	in	1930.	However,	is	it	really	the	return	of	fascism
that	is	haunting	Germany,	or	did	Germany	simply	end	up	as	an	exception	regarding	the	rise	of	the	populist	radical
right	in	Europe?
The	case	of	Germany:	Why	the	AfD	succeeds	where	the	NPD	failed
The	difference	between	the	traditional	extreme	right	and	the	contemporary	populist	radical	right	can	best	be
exemplified	when	looking	at	the	history	and	ideology	of	two	far	right	parties	in	Germany:	the	National	Democratic
Party	(NPD),	founded	in	1964,	and	the	Alternative	for	Germany	(AfD),	founded	in	2013.
Let	us	first	look	at	the	NPD.	The	party	was	founded	by	former	members	of	the	German	Reich	Party	(DRP),	a	party
that	promoted	a	neo-Nazi	ideology.	As	Armin	Pfahl-Traughber	argues,	the	NPD	has	focused	heavily	on	the	anti-
immigration	issue	and	propagated	an	ethnically	homogenous	German	Volk	while	fighting	multiculturalism.	The	NPD
also	addresses	typical	populist	themes	framed	in	strong	anti-systemic	language.	The	party	uses	terms	like	“system
parties”	that	have	also	been	used	by	the	National	Socialists	and	strongly	criticises	a	perceived	“Überfremdung”
(foreign	infiltration)	by	migrants.
The	main	reason	why	the	NPD	never	lost	their	extremist	stigmatisation	is	due	to	examples	of	party	representatives
glorifying	the	Third	Reich.	Former	party	leader	Udo	Voigt	called	Hitler	“a	great	German	statesman”	and	proposed
Hitler’s	deputy	Rudolf	Hess	for	the	Nobel	Peace	Prize.	The	anti-democratic	sentiment,	which	becomes	visible
through	these	examples	of	nostalgia,	demarks	the	conceptual	border	between	populism	and	extremism.	Regarding
international	cooperation,	the	NPD	allies	itself	with	other	extremist	parties	and	is	a	member	of	the	Alliance	for	Peace
and	Freedom	along	with	parties	such	as	Greece’s	Golden	Dawn	or	Kotleba	–	People’s	Party	Our	Slovakia,	the	only
two	truly	extreme	right	parties	with	seats	in	national	parliaments	of	EU	member	states.	All	of	these	parties	are	or
were	investigated	by	state	bodies	with	a	view	to	banning	them.
The	story	of	the	Alternative	for	Germany	is	a	very	different	one.	Originally,	the	party	started	in	2013	as	a	neo-liberal
party	with	a	strong	focus	on	Euroscepticism.	“Alternative”	was	originally	addressing	the	return	to	national	currencies.
In	2015,	Frauke	Petry	gained	control	over	the	party,	the	leading	figure	of	the	national-conservative	wing	who	re-
orientated	the	party	towards	its	current	course	of	nationalist	populism.	In	the	following	period,	the	emphasis	on
national/nationalist	discourse	(“Germany”,	“Germans”,	“Volk”)	became	stronger.
Furthermore,	they	aim	to	re-establish	terms	like	“völkisch”	that	were	misused	by	the	Nazis.	Even	stronger	are	their
articulated	anti-establishment	feelings	that	are	mainly	attacking	the	old	and	established	parties	(“Altparteien/etablierte
Parteien”)	and	public	broadcast	services,	which	are	accused	of	manipulating	public	opinion.	They	identify	a	“political
class”	who	are	blamed	for	using	their	power	to	minimise	the	political	influence	of	citizens.	Chancellor	Merkel	is	at	the
centre	of	their	criticism	since	she	is	identified	as	the	person	responsible	for	the	refugee	crisis	and	is	deemed	to	have
thus	betrayed	“the	people”.
The	AfD	highlights	their	commitment	to	procedural	democratic	principles,	but,	like	other	populist	parties,	has	a
specific,	majoritarian	driven	form	of	democracy	in	mind.	That	becomes	visible,	for	example,	in	their	demand	for
referendums	and	initiatives	at	the	federal	level.	At	the	same	time,	institutions	of	the	current	liberal	and	pluralist
democracy	should	be	weakened,	according	to	the	party.	This	includes	the	disempowerment	of	public	broadcast
services	and	lowering	the	salary	of	politicians.	Unlike	the	NPD,	the	AfD	is	currently	not	subject	to	universal
stigmatisation,	although	single	members	are	under	surveillance	by	the	Office	for	the	Protection	of	the	Constitution.	In
January	2017,	the	party	organised	a	gathering	of	the	EU	parliamentary	populist	far	right	group	Europe	of	Nations	and
Freedom	and	invited	Marine	Le	Pen	and	Geert	Wilders.
Chart:	Vote	share	for	the	NPD	and	AfD	in	state,	national	and	EU	elections	since	2013
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Note:	Each	state	election	is	indicated	with	the	abbreviation	of	the	state’s	name,	with	EU2014	referring	to	the	2014	European
Parliament	elections	and	Bundestag	2017	referring	to	the	2017	federal	elections.	Figures	were	compiled	by	the	authors.
The	key	factors	in	the	AfD’s	success	have	been	the	mobilisation	of	voters	using	xenophobic	and	populist
resentments	that	have	become	socially	acceptable	through	the	discourse	around	refugees,	and	the	transferring	of
anti-Muslim,	anti-refugee,	and	anti-establishment	attitudes	into	votes.	The	rise	of	the	AfD	made	the	NPD	completely
insignificant	at	an	electoral	level,	even	in	former	strongholds.	The	conclusion	here	is	that	despite	domestic	analysts
and	commentators	being	shocked	at	the	AfD’s	success,	what	Germany	is	currently	facing	is	not	the	return	of	fascism,
but	something	that	other	EU	countries	have	been	experiencing	for	years	now.	It	is	the	rise	of	a	populist	radical	right
that	is	successful	precisely	because	of	its	populism	and	not	because	it	embodies	fascism	or	extremism.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.	Featured	image	credit:	ekvidi	(CC	BY-NC	2.0)
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